Interview:U.S.GroundTroopDeploymentinIranBecomesMoreLikelyasWarDragsOn

As the war continues to rage in the Persian Gulf, the region faces a critical juncture: Will the crisis move toward de-escalation, or will it escalate further with an American ground invasion? According to Daniel Levy, president of the U.S./Middle East Project (USMEP) and a former Israeli peace negotiator, the most viable scenario for a ceasefire involves utilizing diplomatic backchannels to guarantee that a truce declaration is met in kind.

In an interview with Caixin, Levy noted that such a diplomatic off-ramp would mean “the U.S. declares victory and ends its strikes, and that Iran responds by declaring its own victory and also desisting from continuing its responses.” He added, “Of course, in this scenario, Israel would have to also agree to desist from attacks.”

However, the threat of American boots on the ground looms over the conflict. Levy identified three possible scenarios for a U.S. ground deployment in Iran. The first would focus on the coastline of the Strait of Hormuz, or perhaps Kharg Island, to seize Iranian oil assets. The second involves a special-operations ground mission to remove Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium. The third entails backing a geographically concentrated, ethnic-group-based insurgency within Iran, particularly utilizing Kurdish forces.

“The longer this war goes on, the greater the possibility becomes that the U.S. may deploy some aspect of ground troops,” Levy warned.

A British-born dual citizen of the U.K. and Israel, Levy holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees in political science from the University of Cambridge. In the 1990s and early 2000s, he served as an Israeli negotiator under Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak, participating in the 1995 Oslo II Accord negotiations and the 2001 Taba Summit with the Palestine Liberation Organization. He also served as a senior adviser in the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office under Barak and advised then-Justice Minister Yossi Beilin. In 2003, Levy was a lead drafter of the Geneva Initiative, an unofficial peace proposal aimed at ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Caixin: As the war continues, why do you believe the United States is seeking a ceasefire with Iran right now? If so, under what circumstances could a ceasefire be achieved?

Daniel Levy: There are clearly ongoing channels of communication via third parties between the U.S. and Iran. Sometimes those channels are used and/or denied by the parties as part of the psyops and disinformation. 

Trump will claim that the Iranians are desperate for talks, but that he is winning and not interested. Or the Iranians will claim that the U.S. is desperate to start negotiations, but that will not happen while the U.S. continues this assault.

The conclusion we can draw is that at this stage, a negotiating track is not playing a significant role. This war is a question of mutual endurance – can America absorb the economic shocks, the political unpopularity and contentiousness domestically of this war, and its possible impact on midterm elections for instance, as well as the wedge this is driving between America and its allies.

On the Iranian side, can Iran absorb the extent of the military strikes which are going after any governing and security structures.

If there is to be a ceasefire, there are really two scenarios:

One is that there is some kind of detailed negotiation in which not only is a ceasefire declared, but other agreements and arrangements are reached, or there is at least an agenda for future discussions.

The other option is probably via a diplomatic channel to guarantee that such a declaration will be met in kind – that the U.S. declares victory and ends it strikes, and that Iran responds by declaring its own victory and also desisting from continuing its responses, and of course, in this scenario, Israel would have to also agree to desist from attacks.

The latter is the more likely scenario. However, the U.S. president in particular does not have a strategy, has a fragile ego and is unpredictable, and the information he is being given is likely not the full picture, and is mostly going to be encouraging him to continue the war – especially what the Israeli leadership and military would be sharing with him and with the American system.

So much depends on the personal decision of one quite unstable individual human being, the commander-in-chief of the United States.

Do you think that the United States would deploy ground troops to Iran’s coastline to ensure the safety of the Strait of Hormuz?

The longer this war goes on, the greater the possibility becomes that the U.S. may deploy some aspect of ground troops. There are three possible scenarios:

One is that those focus on the Straits of Hormuz, would be on the coastline, or perhaps on Kharg Island and would seize Iranian oil assets.

The second is a special ops ground operation to remove Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium (apparently buried deeper or trapped under rubble since U.S.-Israeli airstrikes in June).

The third would be as part of a geographically concentrated ethnic group-based insurgency in a particular zone of Iran. There was some talk that that might be in Kurdish areas using outside-based Kurdish forces who would cross the border. That could conceivably happen in other parts of the country but is now looking less likely.

As soon as there is a significant operation in which ground troops are deployed, that increases the risk for the U.S. It also increases the risk that such an operation would expand and that over time the deployment would increase. This is clearly something that is even more unpopular with the American public, and that Trump is not yet convinced to move forward on.

But as noted, if Trump sees that there is no ability to claim a clear win and decides not to extricate himself from the war he started with the Israelis, then this becomes more possible.

How long do you think Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz will last? Could this prompt Gulf nations to build new pipelines, thereby enabling them to bypass the Strait of Hormuz when exporting oil and gas?

Iran will attempt to maintain its control of the Straits of Hormuz and its willingness to only allow shipping that it agrees to through Hormuz for as long as America attacks Iran, and for as long as it can.

Thus far, the U.S. does not have a solution to this question despite President Trump already on March 3rd declaring that the U.S. would escort ships and open the Strait to commercial vessels.

In many respects, the question of Hormuz is therefore the broader question of Iran's endurance and resilience and ability to continue its response capacity. Experts regarding this shipping passage suggest that there is no likely military solution, that the kind of guarantees and security needed for vessels to pass is far from being secured, and that Iran could sustain this for quite some time, and therefore only a political solution is likely to prevail.

Gulf nations already have some capacity to bypass Hormuz via existing pipelines. So more oil is being diverted to the Red Sea, but that capacity remains limited. Building additional pipelines is not something that can be done in the timeline of the war, and the ability to increase that capacity in the short term is therefore limited. It is of course something one might expect Gulf nations to look at in the longer term.

The other issue with diverting energy for export through the Red Sea is that at some stage, if the Iranian allied Houthi forces enter the war, then that could add a new dimension in Iran’s ability to close down rerouted shipping lanes in the Red Sea. The counterclaim that the Houthis have been deterred or lack a capacity to intervene has echoes of some already upended U.S.-Israeli assumptions regarding Iranian or indeed Hezbollah capacity.

In your view, why has Trump found it difficult to form a coalition to escort ships through the Strait of Hormuz? Does this signal a further rift between the United States and its European allies?

Trump has taken to displaying ever more anger and frustration and to enhancing his criticism of America's European NATO allies but also its defence alliance partners – South Korea and Japan, for their unwillingness to positively respond to his call to join a military effort to reopen the Straits of Hormuz.

It's quite clear that this has been rejected by those states. The reason it has been rejected is that there is no actual Trump plan here that is considered militarily viable. Trump has launched this war, did not have a strategy for this question, and the American military have failed despite Trump's pledges to offer a solution. His requests to his European and Asian allies sound unserious and more like desperation and a chance to not only let off steam and vent criticism but also seem to represent a broader Trumpian disposition towards not believing in or respecting those alliances.

That point is understood by the allies in Europe and Asia who now face a dilemma in terms of what to do next. This has massively deepened the rift with Europe as alongside this America has strengthened Russia's position, removing sanctions on Russian oil, and has diverted resources that could potentially have gone to the Ukraine war effort to the Middle East/West Asia arena, and has gone about insulting Europe.

The Europeans are in a strategic bind and are unclear how to respond. In some ways, the U.S. is dismantling its military empire for an unnecessary war of choice as it moves assets to this arena.

Perhaps the most dramatic statement to have come out of the White House thus far is Trump’s Truth Social post from March 17th in which he addresses America’s core European-NATO and additional allies with the following insult: “speaking as President of the United States of America, by far the Most Powerful Country Anywhere in the World, WE DO NOT NEED THE HELP OF ANYONE!”.

Contact editor Lu Zhenhua (zhenhualu@caixin.com)