Commentary:TheMiddleEastEntersaNewEraofDistrust

* The Gulf is increasingly split over tactics and strategy.

* The Saudi-UAE divergence is one of the region’s most overlooked shifts.

* Beijing has no desire to be the region’s security guarantor.

The Middle East is not merely experiencing another crisis. It is entering a new strategic era — one defined less by ideology than by distrust.

Distrust between allies. Distrust between regional powers. Distrust of external guarantors. And increasingly, distrust of the very assumptions that shaped the region after the Cold War.

Much of the commentary surrounding the current conflict has focused on immediate military developments: Iranian retaliation, Israeli operations, American intervention and fears over oil supply disruptions. But beneath these events lies a deeper transformation that will outlast any ceasefire.

The old Middle East order is breaking down.

Only a few years ago, the region appeared to be moving toward a remarkably different future. The Abraham Accords were widely interpreted as a strategic turning point. Israel’s normalization with the UAE suggested that Arab states were prepared to move beyond decades of hostility in exchange for security cooperation, economic modernization and a common front against Iran.

At the time, Saudi Arabia seemed likely to follow. Had Riyadh formally normalized relations with Israel, the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East would have been fundamentally reshaped.

That trajectory ended with Gaza.

The Hamas attacks and the subsequent Israeli response did more than derail normalization. They exposed how fragile the region’s emerging architecture actually was. What followed was a widening conflict involving Iran, direct American military engagement and deepening fractures among Gulf states themselves.

Today, the central reality is this: almost every major actor in the Middle East believes the regional order is no longer reliable.

The United States remains the most powerful external actor in the region. Militarily, no other country comes close. Yet American power is now accompanied by profound uncertainty about American intentions.

Washington’s stated objectives in the conflict have shifted repeatedly. First came warnings about an imminent Iranian threat. Then discussion of degrading Iran’s military capabilities. Then suggestions of regime change. Then renewed emphasis on nuclear containment.

The inconsistency matters.

For allies and adversaries alike, the problem is no longer simply American power. It is the unpredictability of how that power is exercised. Under President Donald Trump, foreign policy has become highly personalized, centralized and often transactional. Even countries with close ties to Washington increasingly struggle to determine whether American commitments are strategic, temporary or contingent on domestic political calculations.

That uncertainty is now reshaping regional behavior.

Saudi Arabia, for example, entered this crisis deeply concerned about escalation. Riyadh’s priority was stability. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s economic transformation agenda depends on predictable energy markets, foreign investment and regional calm. A prolonged war involving Iran threatens all three.

Yet Saudi leaders also recognize an uncomfortable truth: if the United States chooses confrontation, Gulf states will bear many of the consequences whether they support escalation or not.

This realization is driving a broader Saudi reassessment. While Riyadh continues to value its relationship with Washington, it is also diversifying strategically—deepening ties with China, maintaining channels with Iran and exploring new regional balances that reduce overreliance on American security guarantees.

The UAE has reached a different conclusion.

Abu Dhabi has moved decisively closer to Israel and the United States, believing that hard security alignment offers the best protection in an increasingly volatile region. Emirati leaders point privately to the fact that during recent Iranian attacks, it was American and Israeli systems that provided meaningful defensive support.

This divergence between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is among the most important underappreciated developments in the Middle East today.

For years, the two countries appeared strategically aligned. Mohammed bin Zayed and Mohammed bin Salman were often portrayed as partners shaping a new Gulf order together. But beneath the surface, tensions had already emerged over Yemen, Sudan, Libya and broader regional strategy.

The Emiratis increasingly pursued relationships not only with governments, but also with non-state actors and political factions across the region. From Abu Dhabi’s perspective, this reflected realism: many Middle Eastern states are fragmented, and influence requires engagement with multiple centers of power. The Saudis, however, viewed this approach with growing suspicion, particularly when Emirati-backed groups conflicted with Saudi interests.

The result today is a Gulf increasingly divided over both tactics and long-term strategy.

That division has implications far beyond the Arab world.

One reason the Abraham Accords initially appeared so significant was that they suggested the Middle East was moving toward a more economically integrated and strategically coherent future. Gulf states were investing heavily in logistics, finance, tourism, technology and infrastructure. Dubai positioned itself as a global commercial hub connecting Asia, Africa and Europe. Saudi Arabia launched ambitious modernization projects designed to transform the kingdom into a leading investment destination.

All of this depended on stability.

Now investors are beginning to reassess the region’s underlying assumptions. Financial institutions, family offices and multinational companies that expanded aggressively into the Gulf over the past decade are confronting a reality they had hoped belonged to the past: geopolitical risk in the Middle East is not cyclical. It is structural.

This does not mean capital will flee the region overnight. Gulf states retain enormous wealth, strategic relevance and long-term economic potential. But perceptions have changed. Investors now understand that regional tensions can escalate rapidly and unpredictably, even during periods that appear diplomatically stable.

The most immediate economic concern remains energy.

The vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz has reminded the world that despite decades of globalization and energy diversification, a narrow maritime corridor still carries immense strategic importance. Any sustained disruption would reverberate across global supply chains, inflation rates and financial markets.

Ironically, the crisis may accelerate trends already underway.

Countries are now intensifying efforts to diversify energy routes, expand strategic reserves and invest in alternative infrastructure. China has dramatically increased energy stockpiling since earlier regional confrontations. Asian governments are reconsidering vulnerabilities exposed not only by war but also by the pandemic.

The conflict may also strengthen interest in nuclear energy and renewable technologies as countries seek to reduce dependence on fragile maritime chokepoints. Yet there is also a danger that short-term insecurity pushes states back toward coal and other politically expedient energy sources, slowing the global energy transition.

China’s role in all this remains carefully calibrated.

Beijing has little interest in becoming the Middle East’s security guarantor. Its priorities are economic: open shipping lanes, stable energy flows and regional predictability. Chinese leaders understand clearly that prolonged instability threatens their own economic interests.

At the same time, China benefits strategically when the United States becomes consumed by costly conflicts abroad. From Beijing’s perspective, Washington helped create the current crisis and now expects others to help manage its consequences.

This tension explains China’s cautious diplomacy. Beijing wants de-escalation, but not ownership of the conflict.

Meanwhile, Israel believes time is on its side.

Since the Hamas attacks, Israeli leaders have concluded that international opinion matters less than hard power. The country has pursued an aggressive multi-front strategy designed to weaken hostile actors across the region and establish overwhelming military dominance.

Operationally, Israel has achieved significant successes. Politically, however, the long-term consequences remain uncertain. Israel may emerge stronger militarily yet more isolated diplomatically than at any point in recent history.

Still, for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the current conflict represents not a temporary operation but a strategic opportunity to reshape the regional balance permanently.

That ambition ensures the Middle East will remain volatile even after the current phase of fighting subsides.

The uncomfortable reality is that no major actor fully trusts the future. The Americans distrust Iranian intentions. The Iranians distrust American commitments. Gulf states distrust both escalation and abandonment. Israel distrusts diplomatic guarantees. China distrusts American crisis management.

And in that environment, every country is hedging simultaneously.

This is the defining characteristic of the emerging Middle East order: not alignment, but hedging; not stability, but managed uncertainty.

Joseph Chinyong Liow is a prominent Singaporean scholar of international relations and currently serves as Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.

His research has long focused on the Middle East, Southeast Asian politics, security affairs, and relations between China, the United States, and the wider region. This article is adapted from his remarks at the Caixin Asia Vision Partnership (A30) breakfast dialogue on May 6.