China’sShiftingDemographicsSettoReshapeCollegeAdmissions

The number of students registering for China’s highly competitive national college entrance examination, known as the Gaokao, has fallen for the second consecutive year, signaling a major demographic shift that is set to redraw the country’s higher education landscape.

China’s Ministry of Education announced Wednesday that 12.9 million students have registered for this year’s exam, which begins June 7. The figure represents a decrease of 450,000 from 2025.

The back-to-back declines follow a period of rapid expansion. Registrations had climbed steadily since 2018, fueled by a push to expand higher education. The number of applicants jumped by 1.15 million in 2022 and another 980,000 in 2023, peaking at a record 13.42 million in 2024. In 2025, the figure edged down to 13.35 million, marking the first drop in seven years.

Analysts attribute the current two-year slide to several factors, starting with a shrinking pool of eligible candidates. Total admissions to traditional high schools and secondary vocational schools in 2023 fell by about 100,000 compared with 2022, according to Chen Zhiwen, a member of the academic committee of the Chinese Society of Education Development Strategy.

Additionally, recent reforms to the Gaokao have aimed to discourage rote learning and repetitive test-prep drills. This has led to a noticeable drop in the number of “repeaters” — students who retake the exam in hopes of a better score. Public high schools have also been banned from enrolling such repeaters, further depressing their numbers.

Furthermore, fewer vocational school students are signing up for the vocational version of the exam. As higher education has become widely accessible in China, the value of a college degree has depreciated. With a college diploma no longer guaranteeing a coveted white-collar job, some vocational graduates are choosing to enter the workforce immediately rather than pursue further studies.

While exam registrations are currently sliding, demographic research suggests that China’s higher education system is facing a roller-coaster decade. Over the next 10 years, the country’s college-age population — typically defined as those aged 18 to 22 — is projected to rise to a peak before plunging. This trajectory will present universities with short-term capacity constraints followed by long-term overcapacity.

According to a study led by Hu Juan, a professor at Renmin University of China’s School of Education, and published in Journal of East China Normal University (Educational Sciences), China’s college-age population will rise from 79.4 million in 2025 to a peak of 91.26 million in 2034, growing at an average annual rate of 2.36%.

But the tide will turn rapidly after that. Between 2035 and 2040, the college-age cohort is projected to plummet by 30.83% in just five years, shedding an average of 5.5 million people annually.

Regional disparities

This demographic shift will play out unevenly across China, creating starkly different pressure points for local governments and universities. Hu’s study categorizes the country’s 31 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions into four distinct demographic groups.

First, the megacities of Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin are bracing for a wild ride. In Beijing, for instance, the college-age population is projected to nearly double from 488,700 in 2025 to 963,400 by 2035 — an increase of 97.14% — before tumbling 20.54% over the following five years.

Unless these wealthy cities significantly expand their higher education capacity, particularly at top-tier universities, local high school graduates could face much stiffer competition over the next decade. Still, these three cities remain highly privileged, boasting some of the highest densities of universities and admission rates for elite schools in the country.

A second group, consisting of Guangdong, Guangxi, Xizang, Shaanxi, Qinghai and Ningxia, will see more moderate fluctuations. In Guangdong, the college-age population is expected to grow gradually from 5.36 million in 2025 to a peak of 6.90 million in 2038. The other five regions in this group are expected to experience gentle, steady declines.

The third and largest group includes 14 provinces and municipalities — such as Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shandong — which together account for more than 60% of China’s college-age population. These regions will mirror the national trend: steady growth followed by a cliff-like descent. In Hebei, the college-age population will peak in 2032 at 4.25 million before plunging 30.12% in the following five years. By 2040, Hebei will have nearly 1 million fewer college-age residents than it did in 2025.

The fourth group comprises eight provinces that have already entered, or are about to enter, a period of sustained population decline. This group includes Shanxi, Inner Mongolia and northeastern provinces like Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning. The situation in Heilongjiang is particularly stark: its college-age population is projected to shrink by 45.8% over 15 years, falling from 1.45 million in 2025 to just 784,500 by 2040.

Winners, losers and policy pressures

The impact of these demographic swings will depend heavily on each region’s existing educational resources.

Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin enjoy the strongest starting positions. More than 55% of their higher education institutions offer four-year bachelor’s degrees rather than two- or three-year vocational diplomas. Beijing leads the pack, with 75% of its colleges offering undergraduate programs. These cities are also home to a high concentration of elite universities designated under the central government’s prestigious Double First-Class initiative. Their rich resources give them ample cushion to absorb demographic shocks.

Among the steadier regions, southern China’s manufacturing hub of Guangdong is also well-positioned. In recent years, the provincial government has aggressively expanded its higher education system to support its high-tech industries, establishing new research universities and inviting top national institutions to open local campuses.

Conversely, 11 populous provinces with weaker higher education foundations — including Henan, Shandong, Hebei and Sichuan — face severe structural pressure. During the nationwide push to expand higher education, these provinces relied heavily on vocational colleges, which are cheaper and easier to build. As the college-age population falls off a cliff after 2034, these massive vocational systems will face acute survival threats. Researchers advise these provinces to scale back vocational capacity and upgrade to higher-quality four-year programs.

While Jiangsu, Hubei and Zhejiang also face sharp post-peak declines, their strong existing academic institutions provide more room to maneuver.

In the declining northeast, the population drop could actually make it easier for local students to get into college. Provinces like Heilongjiang and Jilin have high densities of universities per capita. As applicant numbers dwindle, undergraduate admission rates are expected to rise. If managed correctly, these regions’ excess higher education capacity could even be used to attract students and families from other parts of China, helping to offset broader population declines.

To navigate this complex shifting landscape, researchers are calling for national-level planning to coordinate higher education resources across different regions and demographic cycles. For instance, the central government could guide ministries’ universities to adjust their enrollment quotas, shifting spots to provinces facing short-term surges in student numbers and planning ahead for the inevitable contraction in low-birthrate regions.