Thinking the Unthinkable: East Asia Without the US
By Chung-in Moon
“The old order is dying, and the new one is struggling to be born. In this interregnum, morbid symptoms appear.”[1] This somber prediction made by Antonio Gramsci some 90 years ago is recapturing our attention these days. Morbid symptoms are everywhere, and the global order which the US miraculously created following the end of the Second World War is vanishing in disruptive fashion. The intensification of the US-China hegemonic rivalry is plunging the world into an abyss of uncertainty, both geopolitically and geoeconomically. The Westphalian concept of sovereignty and the United Nations Charter, which enshrine the inviolability of sovereignty and territory, are in tatters, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates. An increasing number of areas, including the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea, are highly contested and volatile.
The global growth slowdown, rising trade protectionism and increasing economic and security threats along supply chains are also shaking up the global trade order. China-US economic rivalry as well as the Trump administration’s “beggar thy neighbor” policies involving the aggressive imposition of tariffs, extortive investment inducements and America-centered industrial policy have made the situation worse. Geoeconomic fault lines have become manifest throughout East Asia.
Despite the 2015 Paris Climate Accord, global warming is leading to more extreme weather patterns as well as economic, social and humanitarian damage. In addition, challenges to democracy and human rights are severe. Some advanced democracies are regressing to right-wing populist regimes, while some non-Western countries that have undergone democratic transitions are returning to illiberal democracies. Even in the US, democracy is challenged, as evidenced by the storming of the US Capitol by Trump supporters on January 6, 2021, and by the idiosyncratic governance style of Trump 2.0.
Another noticeable symptom revealed in this interregnum is the relative decline of American power and status in East Asia, precipitating various conjectures on the future of the US in the region, including the idea of an “East Asia without the US.” Such an idea was unthinkable in the past precisely because the American presence was so domineering and beneficial to many countries in the region. Now, “thinking the unthinkable” has emerged as a new narrative among intellectuals in East Asian countries. This essay addresses the convoluted dynamics of the new narratives from an East Asian (South Korean) perspective.
American Hegemony and East Asian Memories of the Old Order
Hegemony refers simply to the configuration of power in which one country enjoys preponderance. Preponderance of power itself is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for hegemonic leadership. A hegemon should have intention and political will to lead the world. The United States after the Second World War was the only country that had the capabilities, intention and political will to lead the world. Having experienced two world wars in 31 years, the US championed the creation of the United Nations based on the concept of collective security and laid the groundwork for a liberal international economic order through the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Bretton Woods monetary system. By fostering a rules-based global order, America significantly contributed to laying the institutional foundations for global peace and prosperity.
Though limited to the free world, the US also served as a patron and bulwark for countries in Europe, Asia and the Middle East against communist threats. Under the grand strategy of containment aimed at curbing Soviet expansion, the US established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the Middle East, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in Southeast Asia and ANZUS in the South Pacific involving Australia, New Zealand, and the US. In East Asia, it formed bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, respectively, providing security umbrellas for these nations while countering the Soviet’s expansionist ambitions. This solidified America’s image as the world’s policeman, while allowing its allies and partners to enjoy a security free-rider status.
The US also established itself as a benevolent benefactor. After the Second World War, its Marshall Plan was instrumental in facilitating the economic reconstruction of post-war Europe, and America played a key role in assisting the economic recovery of Japan, South Korea and other East Asian countries. Moreover, it undertook extensive overseas development assistance (ODA) programs for newly independent states emerging from colonial rule. America’s role in overcoming the destructive legacies of war and revitalizing the global economy deserves special merit.
Notwithstanding some setbacks in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the US won the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1989, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of Warsaw bloc countries ushered in a unipolar world order led by the US, marking the triumph of liberal democracy and market economics, while relegating communism to the margins of history. Francis Fukuyama famously described this as the “end of history,” arguing that the world had entered a new phase of peace and prosperity under the ideology of liberal democracy and market capitalism.
However, Fukuyama’s prediction missed the mark. History, as it unfolded, proved not to be linear but rather a complex cycle of evolutionary and regressive spirals. The events of September 11, 2001, marked a painful inflection point for America. Although the US achieved some success in its war against Islamic terrorists, the costs were substantial. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, justified by the need to punish terrorists and to spread democracy, brought numerous unintended consequences, and the threat of terrorism persists. The unipolar moment under American hegemonic leadership did not last long with the rise of China and the rest of the world. Nevertheless, East Asian countries had a fond memory of the US as a reliable security patron and bulwark, a benevolent economic benefactor, the creator of liberal international order, and a model of democracy and human rights during the Cold War and the post-Cold War era.
The Rise of China-US Strategic Rivalry and Four Battle Grounds
This good old memory began to encounter trouble as strategic rivalry between China and the US drove East Asian countries into a sandwich dilemma. China was poor, chaotic and impoverished until it adopted the transformative policy of opening and reform in December 1978. In less than 30 years, China emerged as the world’s second-largest economy, after the US. In 2010, its trade volume exceeded that of the US. And China held the largest foreign reserves in the world. Its economic wealth eventually led to an unprecedented military build-up, challenging the American unipolar moment. This can be seen as the first morbid symptom of the new interregnum.
China’s ascension precipitated an immense internal debate in the US. Andrew Nathan, in a 2011 Foreign Affairs article, aptly classified two schools of thought in this debate.[2] One is labeled as the Shanghai school, which was represented by Henry Kissinger, and the other is the Ayre Crowe school, represented by most Washington pundits. The Shanghai school basically understood that China’s rise is an inevitable historical process and advocated a new modus vivendi in which the US accommodates China’s rise and gets along with China through a G-2 bigenomic formula. For Kissinger and his associates, the most urgent task was to avoid military clashes between the two giants through cooperation, competition and eventually co-evolution.[3]
Proponents of the Crowe school presented a completely opposite view.[4] As Ayre Crowe warned about threats posed by the sudden rise of Wilhelm II’s Germany in a 1907 report, China’s rise should be taken seriously and be averted through encirclement and containment. The so-called China threat was a common theme among this school, and there was a bitter regret that US engagement with China eventually brought about negative boomerang effects on the US. The Crowe school reflected a subtle combination of American primacy with the fear of power transition. As this hardball, China hawk position became dominant, the Shanghai school became marginalized in Washington circles.
Apart from these two perspectives, Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan offered an alternative perspective in a 2019 Foreign Affairs article.[5] They admitted that China aims to acquire regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific by 2035 and realize global hegemony by 2050. Thus, the US cannot avoid strategic competition with China. However, there is room for cooperation on global issues such as climate change, pandemics and nuclear proliferation. And competition in trade and technology is unavoidable. The US might have to confront China in the areas of democracy and human rights. This 3 Cs approach (cooperation, competition, confrontation) was incorporated in the Joe Biden administration’s China policy.
Regardless of this domestic debate, the overall public mood in the US has radically shifted to an anti-China stance, as Graham Allision’s Thucydides trap hypothesis popularized American fear of China’s rise. American government documents such as the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the Global Posture Review have depicted China as “a revisionist power” threatening American national interests. The days of engagement and cooperation are gone, and the US government has begun to wage strategic rivalry with China on four major fronts: geopolitical, geoeconomic, technological, and in the area of values and global governance.
On the geopolitical front, the US has launched a strategic offensive to encircle and even contain China’s military expansion by pursuing its Indo-Pacific strategy and strengthening cooperation with its allies and partners. The Quad (the security dialogue involving the US, Japan, India and Australia), AUKUS (the defense industrial cooperation scheme in the area of nuclear-powered submarines involving Australia, the UK and the US) and several other minilateral security cooperation arrangements such as Japan-South Korea-US, Australia-Japan-US, and Japan-the Philippines-US are parts of such efforts. The US has increased the intensity and frequency of joint military exercises and training in the Indo-Pacific region. Such strategic moves have invited reciprocal responses from China, heightening tension over the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the East China Sea and even the Korean Peninsula.
Second, the geo-economic front such as trade and investment has also been subject to fierce competition between Beijing and Washington. The US has been seeking a decoupling/derisking strategy that aims not only to divert foreign trade and investment away from China through reshoring, near-shoring, and friend-shoring, but also to isolate China from the global supply chain. China has been responding through coercive economic diplomacy such as export controls on rare earth, a “dual circulation” strategy (relying on exports as well as domestic consumption), and ultimately a self-sustaining economy. The US has also expressed its concern about China’s Belt and Bridge Initiative (BRI) and its move to promote a yuan-based digital currency.
Third, technology has become another dividing factor as its importance grows rapidly for economic competitiveness and national security. The US used to advocate techno-globalism for a relatively free transfer of technology through markets. Its supremacy in proprietary technology drove such trends. China took advantage of techno-globalism to acquire new technologies through the state’s massive orchestration of industrial and technology policy, which is often called techno-nationalism. Such efforts have yielded amazing results. China is now on almost equal footing with the US in most cutting-edge technologies. In terms of the number of scientists and engineers, R&D investments, and patents, China has exceeded the US. Realizing the acute technological challenges, the US has taken tough measures against China by controlling exports of advanced technologies, tightly preventing the theft of critical technology, and forming a technology alliance with allies and partners. As a result, a clash of techno-nationalism has become the most pronounced battle ground between China and the US.
Finally, values and ideology have also emerged as another contentious front. The US has been mobilizing the support of allies and partners to criticize deteriorating conditions of democracy and human rights in China, especially in Hong Kong and among Uyghurs in Xinjiang. China, for its part, denies any human rights violations and emphasizes its own version of democracy with Chinese characteristics. The US has formed a coalition of like-minded democratic countries to press China. Competition for global governance has become another hot issue as President Xi Jinping officially proposed his Global Governance Initiative at the Tianjin Shanghai Cooperation Organization in late August 2025.
China’s rise, assertive American moves to counter it, and associated collateral damage affecting third countries reveal an aspect of “morbid symptoms” in this precarious interregnum period.
Agonizing Strategic Choices for East Asian Countries: The Case of South Korea[6]
As with other East Asian countries, South Korea is torn between the two sides. The US is South Korea’s ally, while China is its strategic cooperative partner. Although Seoul wants to maintain the status quo, mounting pressures from both sides have placed South Korea in a difficult sandwiched position. Washington has been pressing Seoul to endorse its Indo-Pacific strategy and participate in related military activities; to join American decoupling/derisking efforts in trade and investment; to form a technological alliance to cope with China’s challenges; and to support America’s campaign to criticize Beijing’s violation of democracy and human rights and not to join China’s global governance initiative.
In contrast, Beijing has been sending a subtle warning to Seoul that although it does not want South Korea to take sides with China, it should stay neutral. If Seoul gets involved in contingencies such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea by sending its military forces or allows the US to use South Korea as a forward military base to counter China through the additional deployment of its missile defense assets, such as augmenting THAAD (the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system) and deploying American intermediate-range ballistic missiles, China will treat South Korea as an enemy and take corresponding measures.
Economic decoupling/derisking is not easy either, because China accounts for almost 20 percent of South Korea’s total trade. China’s markets are as important as American markets. Moreover, economic interdependence between China and South Korea formed through global supply chains is deep and wide. More than 20,000 South Korean companies are currently doing business in China. South Korea has also joined the BRI by participating in the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). More importantly, small- and medium-sized enterprises in South Korea depend heavily on Chinese imports and tourists.
Technology seems less problematic because South Korea’s technological cooperation with China has been very limited. For example, South Korea is not dependent on 5G technology of Chinese origin. But cooperation in semiconductors and batteries for electric vehicles has become a source of American concern, and the US has been urging South Korea to take its side in coping with China’s technological rise.
As for values and global governance, Washington has not been explicit in calling for South Korea to take an anti-China stance on democracy and human rights. Nevertheless, the South Korea-US alliance has gone beyond its military dimensions and includes shared values. The Yoon Suk Yeol government co-hosted the third Democracy Summit with the US in March 2024 that implicitly targeted China. Nevertheless, Seoul’s room to maneuver has been fundamentally constrained by the “one China policy” and the principle of non-interference in domestic politics it pledged at the time of diplomatic normalization in 1992. On the issue of global governance, whereas South Korea has been sympathetic with China’s call for the resuscitation of the United Nations, the multilateral trade order and open regionalism, it has followed overall American policy lines in various international forums.
How has South Korea responded to this strategic dilemma? Current domestic debates suggest four strategic choices: pro-American balancing, “bandwagoning” China, standing alone, or maintaining the status quo by muddling through.
Conservative politicians, pundits and media favor a pro-American “balancing,” which refers to taking sides with the US to balance the rise of China as a revisionist power. Like realists, they contend that China as a rising power cannot help but be aggressive, and that the re-emergence of China is a potential and substantive threat to the Korean Peninsula, leading to its Finlandization in which South Korea will lose its autonomy by being subjugated to China. Negative public perceptions of China stemming from its past invasion, domination and participation in the Korean War against South Korea contributes to support for this pro-American option. In addition, they argue that values are another reason why South Korea should strengthen its alliance with the US and balance the rise of China.
Its proponents call for active participation in US-led regional military activities, joining the decoupling/derisking strategy in trade, investment and technology, and voicing greater objections to China’s violation of human rights and democracy. It is expected that the balancing will enhance South Korea’s conventional and nuclear deterrence against North Korea and China and prevent the Finlandization trap.
However, this approach is not without substantial costs and limitations. Contrary to their expectations, South Korea’s security could be jeopardized rather than stabilized, not only because China will emerge as a direct threat, but also because close military cooperation between Beijing and Pyongyang, including the supply of weapons and logistical support, will make North Korea a more formidable additional threat to South Korea. As Henry Kissinger once told me, “China is too near and powerful to ignore or antagonize.” China’s economic retaliation—such as the formal and informal economic and cultural sanctions imposed by China on South Korea after it allowed the deployment of the THAAD missile system in 2017—could deal a critical blow to the South Korean economy.
Some historians suggest “bandwagoning” China as an alternative. This approach seeks security and economic benefits by taking sides with the rising power China. They invoke a lesson from the humiliating defeat in the Manchu War of 1636 in which King Injo of the Chosun Dynasty had to make three big bows and nine kowtows to Houjin’s leader Hong Taiji. The tragedy was a result of Chosun’s miscalculation of the power transition in which it took sides with the declining Ming, not with the rising Qing. For them, China is rising, and the US is declining, with a greater possibility of disengagement from South Korea. Thus, it is wise for South Korea to go along with China. Here bandwagoning China means a fundamental geopolitical realignment through which South Korea turns into the Chinese sphere of influence. Under this scenario, the South Korea-US alliance would come to an end, and South Korea would likely seek more active military and economic cooperation with China. South Korea would also be a robust participant in the Belt and Road Initiative, while remaining silent on China’s democracy and human rights situation.
The bandwagoning China strategy could facilitate peace and stability, particularly if the US disengages from the Korean Peninsula. However, short-term risks resulting from transitional strategic uncertainty, fear of “Finlandization,” if not absorption by China in the long term, and the high economic opportunity costs of taking sides with China, while shrinking or losing economic ties with the US and Japan, could shake South Korea’s security and economic foundations. In addition, silence on human rights in China could severely damage South Korea’s global reputation. More importantly, domestic political opposition will be formidable. Strong anti-Chinese public sentiment in South Korea will limit its feasibility. Moreover, Beijing does not seem to welcome such a sudden shift in Seoul, because it prefers the status quo.
Some in South Korea champion a standing alone strategy for a more autonomous diplomatic space, breaking away from the influence of the big powers. There are two contending approaches. The right-wing nationalists doubt the reliability of the American nuclear umbrella and its extended nuclear deterrence strategy and maintain that South Korea should become a middle power with nuclear armaments. For them, South Korea’s military independence backed by nuclear weapons is the only way to effectively manage the whims of big powers and to ensure national security and dignity.
In stark contrast, however, the left-leaning pacifists argue that South Korea should be free from the influence of strong powers by declaring a permanent neutral state. They call for the withdrawal of American forces from South Korea and the termination of the alliance with the US. Both approaches might appeal to nationalist or pacifist sentiments but are neither practical nor feasible. Being too idealistic, they are not likely to gain public support.
Most South Koreans, whether they are politicians, intellectuals or laypeople, prefer the strategy of status quo via muddling-through that is predicated on a simultaneous pursuit of an alliance with the US and a strategic cooperative partnership with China. Since the days of President Kim Dae-jung, governments in South Korea have followed this strategic line in the name of a balanced diplomacy or a diplomacy of ‘anmi gyeongjung’ (security with the US, economy with China). Its proponents claim that although the US should remain the top priority as the most valuable ally, it should not be at the expense of China. They also argue that such double dipping or double hedging is the best way to ensure national security, maximize economic benefits, and balance national interests and values.
Such muddling through may work when relations between the US and China are congenial. But political scientist Stephen Walt warned more than a decade ago that “If Sino-American rivalry heats up – as I believe it will – then Beijing and Washington will press Seoul to choose sides.”[7] That is what is currently happening in the Korean context. The US-China relationship is deteriorating, and the status quo strategy is reaching a breaking point, especially on the US side. American pressure is not limited to the security area, but extends to the economy, technology and values. A moment of truth is approaching, and South Korea may have to make an agonizing choice.
In sum, the public in South Korea strongly supports the status quo option through muddling through. Liberal and progressive camps, including the current ruling camp, also support the status quo approach. Double hedging seems to be most preferred. However, the conservative camp favors the pro-American balancing strategy. Support for the bandwagoning China and “standing alone” options seems marginal. Likewise, domestic political factors play an important role in shaping Seoul’s strategic choices. But external variables such as threats from North Korea and American influence cannot be ignored because they pose major structural constraints. At present, the Lee Jae Myung government is trying to seek a balanced strategy in favor of status quo through muddling through, which is a profound deviation from the pro-American balancing strategy of the previous Yoon government.
As with South Korea, most East Asian countries are currently going through similar internal debates, but variations seem wide. Whereas Japan and the Philippines have taken a pro-American balancing strategy, ASEAN member countries, most of which do not have formal alliances with the US, have been seeking a double hedging option of walking a tight rope between Beijing and Washington. Meanwhile, North Korea is trying to take advantage of such cleavages to consolidate the northern trilateral security and economic cooperation with China and Russia. All this indicates that deepening strategic rivalry between China and the US is a bad omen foretelling the arrival of the new age of interregnum, triggering an unprecedented new regional dynamic in East Asia.
Trump 2.0 Shock: South Korean Experiences
The inauguration of Trump 2.0 in January 2025 and a series of executive orders afterwards have made morbid symptoms of the interregnum even more pronounced. President Trump’s “America First” foreign policy goals and transactional conduct have placed South Korea and East Asia countries in a serious dilemma. The US is no longer a benevolent hegemon, but an extortionist, and has become a liability rather than an asset.[8] Let’s investigate the South Korean case and draw implications for East Asia.
Trump has been persistently sending a common message to America’s East Asia allies and partners that they have been free riders and that American security protection has not been properly reciprocated. They should pay back. He has been repeating the same claim since 2016. After his second inauguration in 2025, his call for reciprocity has intensified.
Trump 2.0’s call for the modernization of the South Korea-US alliance underscores his grievance par excellence. Trump asked South Korea to increase its defense burden sharing from the current 2.6 percent of GDP to 5 percent. Expressing his dissatisfaction with South Korea’s defense cost-sharing of American forces stationed there, Trump personally demanded that Seoul should increase the current level of $1 billion of defense cost sharing to $10 billion per year. The Biden administration and the South Korean government just renewed the Special Measure Agreement on defense cost sharing in October last year, but Trump wants to scrap it by blaming Biden’s poor negotiations. On various occasions, Trump threatened to pull out American troops unless Seoul covers a larger share of defense burden and costs. He even went further by declaring that the age of free-riding allies is over and that the US would not intervene in a war between South and North Korea.
Trump’s MAGA base has raised even more fundamental issues. MAGA is opposed to US troops being stationed overseas. They also think South Korea treats United States Forces Kores (USFK) as a “tripwire” that would provoke a massive US military response in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula. They are also concerned that USFK would be the target of a preemptive strike either by North Korea or China. As such, they want US troops on the Peninsula to be drawn down or withdrawn altogether. In contrast, American China hawks want USFK’s role to be adjusted, and expanded, from deterrence against North Korea to containment of China. Toward that end, they advocate giving the force “strategic flexibility.” That means American forces in South Korea should be allowed freely in and out of the Peninsula without due consultation with South Korea, depending on American needs.
The same China hawks call for the South Korean military to become active participants in Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Thus, as part of the South Korea-US alliance modernization, the US wants Seoul to come up with more explicit commitment of its military forces to contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and elsewhere. This reflects a logical consequence of limited US military capabilities.
Equally troublesome is the second Trump administration’s hardball push for economic concessions from Seoul. As evidenced by his own remarks, Trump believes that East Asian allies and partners became prosperous by “ripping off the US” and that they should pay back. As part of such moves, Trump began to adopt aggressive tariff policies. He first imposed 50 percent unilateral tariff on steel, aluminum and its derivatives starting from Aug. 18, 2025, followed by 25 percent reciprocal tariffs on all items coming from South Korea. He also declared that the US will be applying additional high tariffs to semiconductor chips and pharmaceutical products.
Trump then announced that he would lower South Korea’s reciprocal tariffs to 15 percent on condition that South Korea purchases $100 billion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and other energy products and sets up a $350 billion investment fund for shipbuilding, nuclear energy and other manufacturing sectors. Worse is that Trump himself decides where funds are allocated and insists that the US public receive 90 percent of the return on investment. More importantly, Trump wants upfront cash investments. Compared with the Trump request of investments from EU ($600 billion) and Japan ($550 billion), the South Korean share is relatively small, but it accounts for 82 percent of Seoul’s total foreign reserves and 6.5 percent of its GDP. Practically speaking, South Korea cannot afford to come up with this amount of cash up-front.
Such requests were a complete reversal of the past. South Koreans’ bitter feeling about the Trump administration has been amplified precisely because the US president totally ignored the fact that South has a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with the US. In fact, Trump himself ordered its renegotiation in 2017 because he thought it was unfair to the US, and both parties agreed on the revised version. Yet he treated South Korea like other nations that do not have FTAs with the US. More critically, a recent massive detention of South Korean workers at a Hyundai Motors plant in Savannah, Georgia caused immense anti-American sentiment in South Korea. The US begged South Korean firms to invest in the US. When they did by sending 320 engineers and technicians with valid visas to assemble the plant, ICE officers raided the plant and handcuffed and shackled them as if they were criminals. Those scenes of brutal arrest were instantly televised to the world and South Korea. Such ungrateful American behavior enraged South Koreans.
Finally, America has long served as the beacon of democracy and human rights. The American constitution and democracy have been exemplum virtutis for South Koreans to follow and imitate. But that image has been shattered, largely because of the political campaign by the American far right to undercut democracy and constitutional order in South Korea. Former president Yoon was impeached and imprisoned for an insurrection charge because he declared martial law on Dec. 3, 2024, in violation of the constitution. But the American far right, who are mostly drawn from conservative evangelical Protestants, came up with all kinds of conspiracy theories criticizing the impeachment decision by the South Korean constitutional court.
Just a few hours before the summit with President Lee on Aug. 24, President Trump, under the influence of members of the far right, posted satirical remarks on social media asking, “is Yoon’s impeachment and arrest a ‘purge or revolution’?” It was just a taste of what is coming. Newt Gingrich — the former US congressman – thundered in an Aug. 27 column in The Washington Times that the Lee administration’s “recent all-out assault on political and religious liberty has been breathtaking.” Along the same lines, the Build Up Korea 2025 conference, which was modeled after Turning Point USA, was held at the Kintex exhibition center in Ilsan on Sept. 5, 2025, in a conscious effort to expand the presence of the far right in South Korea. A sizable contingent of radical MAGA figures from the US appeared at the event, featuring Charlie Kirk, just one week before his tragic assassination, who preached the conservative gospel to young Koreans.
The common denominator behind these events was conservative Christian nationalism. They were trying to build a transnational conservative coalition to disseminate Trump-style MAGA ideology, while questioning and denying South Korean democracy, the constitutional order, and Lee Jae Myung’s legitimacy as president. Such transnational bonds and the temptation to intervene in South Korean politics may pose a serious threat to the future of South Korea-US relations.
Facing these pressures from Washington, the Lee government’s response has been quite different from that of the previous government. Lee has said South Korea will take the lead in its own defense, while reducing its dependence on the US. For this purpose, he strongly desires to take back wartime operational control that is transferred to the hands of the American commander in South Korea. He also declared that Seoul would raise defense spending from the current level of 2.6 percent of GDP to 3.5 percent. Since USFK will be transformed into a supplementary military force on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea would reduce the amount of its financial contribution to the cost of stationing American troops on the Peninsula.
Furthermore, the Lee government made it clear that it does not support USFK adopting the “strategic flexibility” doctrine and that USFK should be devoted to maintaining a credible deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. And President Lee is reluctant to make an official commitment to direct military support for American forces in the case of contingencies in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. There is a fear of entrapment by the US on the part of the South Korean government and people. It is not only because of untended intertwinement with conflicts in other areas that it does not want to get involved in, but also because of negative linkage effects on the Korean Peninsula.
And the Lee government has been the toughest negotiator with the Trump administration on tariff and investment issues. Seoul cannot accept the terms of investment that Trump requested (e.g., cash composition, arbitrary allocation by Trump, and unfair profit sharing), and negotiations between Lee and Trump during the APEC summit on November 29 resulted in much fairer outcomes. Of $350 billion committed, $150 billion will go to the shipbuilding sector in South Korean terms. As for the remainder ($200 billion), the ROK will spread its investment over the period of ten years (i.e., $20 billion per year) and the cash portion will be readjusted, depending on its overall foreign exchange situation. Return on investments will be split 50:50 between the two countries until the original amount of investment funds is recovered. In return, the US decided to lower its reciprocal tariffs from the current 25 percent to 15 percent including automobiles. Apart from trade and investment, there has also been a growing awareness of the political danger posed by the transnational ultraright coalition between American MAGA/ Christian nationalist forces and South Korean far right Protestant groups.
East Asia without the US? Three Scenarios and Their Implications
Recent American unilateral, self-centered, and even predatory behavior has revealed that the US under Trump 2.0 is not the one we used to know. The US is no longer a hegemonic stabilizer, but a hysterical contender with China. It is no longer our patron and bulwark, but a cumbersome partner who tries to tap capabilities and resources of allies and partners. It has become increasingly unreliable, extortionist and intrusive. South Koreans’ cognitive dissonance on the US has become severely aggravated under Trump 2.0. In a nutshell, the US is seen as a liability, not as an asset, as a disastrous model to be avoided, and as an unreliable partner to work with. Those good days of the old order are being destroyed by its own creator, while a new order is not yet to be born. It is in this interregnum that East Asian countries have begun to deliberate on the idea of “East Asia without the US.”
Some pundits argue that we should not rush. When Trump 2.0 will be gone in three years, the US will return to its original orbit of liberal internationalism or a traditional conservative realist line. Judging on current US domestic politics, however, such anticipation seems like inertia-driven, naïve thinking. We do not see any clarity, coherence and consistency in current US foreign policy. Whereas President Trump indulges in narcissistic transactional calculations, his support base of MAGA forces is pounding on retrenchment, isolation and homeland security. Whereas primacists advocate the traditional realist line of thinking for global power projection as America being No.1, prioritizers appear to prevail over them simply because the US is short of capabilities and resources to cover all the major theaters of Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. As prioritizers argue, China’s threat is real, and the US should concentrate its power and capabilities on encircling and containing China. Apart from these approaches, neo-cons and liberal internationalists are equal competitors in the shaping of American foreign policy. East Asians have doubts about the future of American foreign policy even after the Trump era is over. Ideological rigidity, political polarization and hubris, all of which are deeply embedded in the fabric of American foreign policymaking, cloud the future of its commitment and leadership in East Asia. This erratic nature of American foreign policy drives East Asian countries to think the unthinkable: East Asia without the US.
What is meant by “East Asia without the US?” Three versions can be imagined. The first is complete US disengagement from the region. It could involve the termination of treaty alliances, the withdrawal of American troops, and the suspension of bilateral or regional military cooperation. Such disengagement could be possible under three circumstances. They would be the American return to retrenchment and new isolationism reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine; Washington’s acceptance of a sphere of influence with China and a voluntary disengagement from the region; and finally, East Asian countries’ decision to terminate their alliance ties with the US and to pursue a self-reliant posture individually or collectively. In reality, such complete disengagement seems quite inconceivable, but it cannot be completely ruled out.
The second involves a loose form of an American alliance system. Under this scenario, the US is likely to remain as an offshore balancer against China in which it withdraws its troops from Japan and South Korea, while committing to its extended nuclear deterrence to them. The logic behind this scenario is that while American allies defend themselves against actual or potential adversaries such as North Korea and China, the US will provide them with nuclear umbrellas and other bridging capabilities they lack in the case of contingencies. Under this scenario, US alliance commitment would continue without ground troops, and the US would try to outsource its defense capabilities to allies and partners in the region. In this case, the American alliance system would continue, but in a much weaker form.
Finally, the third version could be manifested through precarious status quo maintenance. While maintaining the existing alliance structure, the US would come up with a weak and often chaotic commitment along with weak capabilities. The current Trump 2.0 policy resembles this scenario. Domestic political fragility, conflicting signals and weaker capabilities could tempt its allies and partners in the region to think about alternative regional security architectures. Although the US-centered alliance structure remains intact, regional allies and partners might try to get away from the US by either seeking close partnership with China or forming intra-regional cooperation that could cope with a weaker American commitment or ultimately its disengagement from the region.
Concluding Remarks: Alternative Visions for East Asia
Michael Green, in his book By More than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783, argues that American intervention in Asia Pacific, especially East Asia, is more than destined. It is a historical mandate. Thus, for him and others, American disengagement is virtually unthinkable. But such belief is being increasingly questioned in the new interregnum.
East Asis without the US should not be seen as the end of security, prosperity and peaceful co-existence. On the contrary, it could turn into a blessing. East Asian countries could build a new security community, a common zone of economic prosperity, and a new space of cultural harmony. But creating such a community will be a daunting challenge. It will require new thinking, new leadership and a new domestic political structure.
East Asian countries need an imaginative and innovative approach. In this regard, I propose a transcending diplomacy. Noted American diplomatic historian Paul Schroeder coined the term “transcending” to describe the attempt by weak states to “surmount international anarchy and go beyond the normal limits of conflictual politics; to solve the problem, end the threat, and prevent its recurrence through some institutional arrangement involving an international consensus or formal agreement on norms, rules, and procedures for these purposes.”[9] A transcending diplomacy could be a useful option to mitigate the rivalry and confrontation between China and the US, because it proposes multilateral security cooperation as well as the restoration of multilateral regimes to resolve unending trade and technology problems. The same can be said of human rights.
Individual East Asian countries alone cannot initiate this effort. They should work with other middle powers in the region that face a similar dilemma: Japan, Australia, Canada and ASEAN. They should mobilize support from other sandwiched European and BRICs middle powers. This group should forge a new international consensus on norms, principles, rules and procedures to prevent US- China conflicts in geopolitics, geo-economy, technology and values. Many of them are either American allies or partners and at the same time major economic partners with China. Their collective action is the only viable way to take China and the US out of their game of chicken and to restore international order through multilateral cooperation. Geopolitics is not destiny. We can overcome geopolitical destiny through multilateralism and open regionalism. In this regard, I would like to propose the following:
– Be prepared. The US is unpredictable. Secure strategic autonomy, strengthen self-defense, and work together with others to create a new regional order devoid of American centrism, be it the hub-and-spoke or lattice model.
– Transform the current US-centered collective defense system to collective security system anchored in the UN charters. Collective defense and subsequent alliance systems assume common enemies and common threats, which will in turn lead to a perpetual vicious cycle of security dilemmas. The most sensible way to break the vicious cycle is to alter our way of thinking about security. Security is indivisible and can be achieved through cooperation. Common, cooperative and comprehensive security should be guiding principles. We should learn from the Helsinki process and the OSCE model, which has never been tried in East Asia but can serve as a useful benchmark.[10]
– East Asian countries have been the greatest beneficiaries of open regionalism and a multilateral liberal trade order. They all believe in the virtue of diffuse reciprocity embedded in GATT/WTO and associated open regionalism, while rejecting unilateralism and bilateralism. They should work together to restore the liberal multilateral trade order, while complementing open regionalism with it. It is more so because President Trump has been pursuing divide-and-rule tactics in implementing his “beggar thy neighbor” policies. Promotion of intra-regional economic cooperation through RCEP, CPTPP, and a China-Japan-South Korea trilateral FTA seems a logical choice.
– Cultural pluralism should be preserved. East Asia itself is an amalgamation of diverse cultural, social and political entities. Mutual respect for differences should be the foundation for peaceful coexistence. As the United Nations Charter stipulates, respect for sovereignty and territory should be preserved; any pending conflicts should be resolved peacefully; and there should be no interference with domestic political affairs. Empathy should serve as a new norm for mutual understanding and interactions.
– Finally, if we perceive international politics in terms of zero-sum, win or lose logic, there will be no room for compromise. Win-win positive sum outcomes should guide our interactions with others.
[1] Antonio A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), p.275.
[2] Andrew Nathan, “What China Wants- Bargaining with Beijing,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2011).
[3] Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Group, 2011), epilogue.
[4] Ayre Crow is a British diplomat who authored the infamous 1907 Crowe report on the danger of the rise of the German empire under Wilhelm II and prescribed offensive moves to encircle and contain Germany. For example, Kissinger attributed the outbreak of the First World War to the report. See Henry Kissinger, On China, epilogue.
[5] Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan: “Competition Without Catastrophe” https://share.google/WWqQNd0qbASKuEwbh
[6] This portion draws partly on Moon Chung-In & Sung-won Lee, “South Korea’s Geopolitics: Challenges and Strategic Choices,” March 18, 2022. South Korea’s geopolitics: Challenges and strategic choices | Melbourne Asia Review
[7] Stephen M. Walt, “The Shifting Security Environment in Northeast Asia,” Paper Presented at the International Conference on Korea Questions: Balancing Theory and Practice, organized by the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Seoul, South Korea, Oct. 7, 2011.
[8] The US is also analyzing its East Asian allies and partners in terms of assets and liabilities. Please refer to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Liability? Auditing U.S. Alliances to Compete with China (2025) https://share.google/qlGNmAnfyyv2LDKka
[9] Schroeder, Paul. “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory.” International Security, vol. 19 no. 1, 1994, p. 108-148. Project MUSE, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/447319.
[10] See Jeff Sachs vs. John Mearsheimer on sphere of influence vs. sphere of security https://www.jeffsachs.org/newspaper-articles/bhz5esejg7fb8d2emxznalgf98n89k