The Coup of December 3, 2024, in South Korea: Background and Lessons for Democracy
An assessment by Advisory Board member Univ.-Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Frank, University of Vienna
On the evening of December 3, 2024, South Korea’s president, Yoon Suk-yeol, declared martial law. There was no apparent immediate cause for this action. There had been no North Korean attack, no collapse of public order due to prolonged demonstrations, nationwide strikes, or natural disasters.
It is, therefore, difficult not to describe this act as a coup, even though it originated from the sitting president. Yoon stated: “I declare martial law to protect the Republic of Korea from the threats posed by North Korean communist forces, to immediately eliminate the ruthless pro-Pyongyang and anti-state forces that rob our people of freedom and happiness, and to preserve the liberal democratic basic order.”
Ideological Foundations
Where does such rhetoric come from, and what associations does it evoke among Koreans when linked to a president’s declaration of martial law?
The conflation of “anti-state” with “pro-North Korean” or “pro-communist” has a certain tradition in South Korea, both under Yoon and his predecessors. Even before the official foundation of the Republic of Korea, the military carried out a massacre on Jeju Island in 1948 in the name of anti-communism—an event that remained largely unaddressed for decades. The brutal suppression of opposition under the dictator and former officer of the Japanese colonial army Park Chung-hee, and later under General-turned-President Chun Doo-hwan after 1979, relied heavily on nationwide martial law. Particularly ingrained in Korea’s collective memory is the killing of hundreds of pro-democracy demonstrators in Gwangju in May 1980 by military special forces—a few months before the International Olympic Committee awarded the 1988 Summer Olympics to South Korea.
Anti-North Korean anti-communism was long the central pillar of South Korean identity. This was partly because significant portions of the elite, due to their close collaboration with the Japanese before 1945, could hardly credibly base their legitimacy on anti-colonialism, unlike their counterparts in the North. They implemented the anti-communist creed with particular zeal and radicalism. Even for Koreans socialized in the 1980s, being labeled a “ppalgaengi” (“red”) could spell the end of one’s career and social standing, if not worse.
Accordingly, as my colleague Dan Gudgeon highlights in his recent research, South Korea’s democratization struggle was largely tied to overcoming the “red” stigma. The dictatorship successfully discredited any opposition as pro-North Korean for years. This era is not that distant: Chun’s dictatorship was only overthrown in 1987/88, and the last ex-general left the presidency in 1993. As with other cases, such as Germany’s reunification, it often takes more than three decades to bridge deep societal divides.
There are even speculations that Yoon deliberately sent drones to Pyongyang weeks ago to provoke a military reaction from North Korea, which he could then frame as an act of aggression, redefining it as a national security crisis to justify martial law. Earlier allegations this year against Yoon’s close associates, including Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun, are now being revisited. Kim reportedly considered using martial law to suppress the opposition.
Why?
Martial law was lifted after less than six hours. In hindsight, this may make that dramatic moment look less significant, but events could have developed very differently had many South Koreans not acted decisively.
A majority of parliamentarians rushed to the National Assembly building in Seoul before the military could fully secure it. While the military followed the president’s orders, video footage shows they acted with restraint—no shots were fired, and physical altercations with demonstrators and parliamentarians were limited to minor scuffles. Media outlets continued to report objectively and continuously despite uncertainty about whether this would remain permissible.
Speculation about Yoon’s motives extends to foreign policy and international dynamics. In any case, it is paradoxical that he raised the specter of a pro-North Korean coup in December 2024—a year after North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un declared South Korea a foreign state and reunification no longer a goal.
The true reasons are, therefore, primarily sought in domestic politics. The list is long: it ranges from allegations of corruption against the president’s wife to catastrophically low approval ratings, which stood at a historic low of 17% in early November. Even intoxication or a loss of touch with reality due to radical advisors has been mentioned.
However, it is likely that the most mundane motives will prove to be the most significant once the facts are fully known. The opposition, with its parliamentary majority, had recently imposed severe restrictions on the president’s budget plans, and impeachment proceedings were looming against government officials and Yoon himself. The theory of a purely domestic motive and an attempt to neutralize the opposition is further supported by the apparently very unprofessional preparation of the coup. It is possible that an increasingly frustrated Yoon, a former prosecutor and political outsider, simply wanted a state of emergency to finally govern freely and without obstruction.
Consequences
Barely 48 hours after the declaration of martial law, it is difficult to predict the consequences of this event, especially as the process is still unfolding and new developments in any direction remain possible. Nevertheless, one must first and foremost commend South Korea’s democracy for successfully navigating this phase of the crisis with sovereignty.
Through all this, it has once again become apparent that South Korea remains a highly polarized society, despite all efforts to address and overcome its trauma-laden past. Since I began studying Korea in the early 1990s, I have repeatedly encountered the term namnam galteung (South-South division) as a description of the deep ideological rifts within South Korean society.
The question of South Korea’s stance toward North Korea has now regained relevance. In recent years, the thesis that especially the younger generation in South Korea has little interest in the neighboring country and reunification has been widespread. Experts have consistently cautioned against accepting this assumption uncritically. While the importance of the northern neighbor regularly ranks far below issues like the economy or the education system in pre-election surveys, the current crisis clearly demonstrates that this topic has merely receded beneath the surface without truly disappearing.
Depending on how the situation develops, the risk of destabilizing South Korea is not yet averted. It is conceivable that Yoon could portray himself as a victim and interpret the forced end of martial law as evidence of the strength of the pro-North Korean forces he warned against within South Korea.
A genuine domestic crisis in South Korea could be exploited by the North, even though there is currently no indication of such intent. Seoul lies only 70 kilometers from the dividing line between the two Koreas, and the North Korean army is stationed at the border. Technically, they could reach Seoul within an hour. Hopefully, this will remain a grim fantasy, but given the unexpected coup, even for those within South Korea’s political inner circle, it is difficult to rule anything out categorically.
At least so far, there has been no official media response from Pyongyang, which could, with some optimism, be interpreted as deliberate restraint. Perhaps Kim Jong-un is simply waiting and watching as his enemy on the southern side of the 38th parallel weakens itself. Within security circles, discussions are already underway about the potential negative impact on the trilateral alliance between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, officially aimed at North Korea and, in practice, likely also at China.
Lessons
It will take some time for the situation to calm down and for us to fully understand the facts. But Yoon’s reliance on polarizing ideology and rhetoric infused with hate, as outlined above, should alarm us in other Western democracies and prompt us to engage in critical self-reflection.
This begins, as Confucius would suggest, with our choice of words: do we speak of political opponents or state enemies? Of rebels or insurgents? Of freedom fighters or terrorists?
We often read that our democratic systems are primarily based on values. Yet, these values can be corrupted and misused. Therefore, we must advocate even more decisively and consciously for the principle that the ends do not justify the means. The example of South Korea has once again shown how easily a real or perceived threat to these values can be used as a pretext to restrict our freedoms—the very essence of those values.
The strength of our democracies does not lie in the superiority or correctness of our ideology. The strength of our democracies lies in their adherence to jointly agreed rules, and this adherence must be fundamental, not selective: rule of law, not rule by law—especially when it is difficult.
Let us understand the dramatic events in South Korea as a warning of where self-righteous ideology can lead us. But let us also see the swift and bloodless end of martial law as a sign of hope and an impressive victory of rules-based democracy over populism, reason over hate, and restraint over recklessness.
Image: – stock.adobe.com