Global Neighbours Policy Brief – Navigating Multipolar Anarchy: Strategic Options for Middle Powers in a Fragmenting World

An assessment by Advisory Board member Univ.-Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Frank, University of Vienna

This paper is part of the Global Neighbours Policy Brief series, which offers concise expert analyses on key strategic questions in a changing world.

Abstract

The post-Cold War international order is giving way to a new and uncertain configuration best described as Multipolar Anarchy—a fragmented landscape defined by the erosion of global rules, the rise of competing regional orders, and strategic fluidity. This article introduces the concept of Multipolar Anarchy as both a diagnostic tool and a basis for action, particularly for middle powers navigating this emerging reality. Drawing lessons from East Asia’s experience with systemic disruption in the late 19th century, it argues that agency and strategic foresight—not passive adaptation—will determine which states emerge strengthened. The article outlines forward-looking strategies tailored to middle powers, including regional coalition-building, economic diversification, and inter-regional coordination. Rather than viewing this phase as a threat, the author contends it should be treated as an opportunity: to mitigate global disorder, enhance resilience, and even lay the groundwork for a more inclusive and representative global order.

Introduction and Overview

The structure of international relations is undergoing a substantial transformation. Major geopolitical and geoeconomic actors are redefining the rules of the game, ushering in what may be described as a new imperial age of Multipolar Anarchy. Rather than a simple “changing of the guard,” we may be facing a prolonged absence of any global hegemon willing—or able—to set and enforce the rules of the international system. This scenario fundamentally challenges long-standing assumptions about security, cooperation, and global governance.

In this context, the need arises to chart a course through growing uncertainty: to understand the evolving strategic environment, identify both risks and opportunities, and explore pathways for adaptation and progress among states, institutions, and societies.

This article seeks to contribute to that effort by:

• Providing a conceptual framework for understanding the emerging condition of Multipolar Anarchy and its systemic implications;
• Drawing on East Asia’s historical and contemporary experiences as a lens through which to anticipate potential dynamics in other regions;
• Proposing forward-looking strategies tailored to the interests and capabilities of middle powers operating within this evolving landscape.

Multipolar Anarchy

The crisis of the international order has been the subject of extensive debate for many years.[i] However, historically, the existence of a coherent global order has been the exception rather than the norm—if it existed at all prior to 1945.[ii] What makes the current situation particularly challenging is, therefore, not its novelty, but the fact that few of us have any first-hand experience with a world that is neither bipolar nor unipolar. The phenomenon itself is not new; but it is new to us.

As with any complex condition, the first step toward a solution is the deliberate recognition and comprehensive understanding of its nature. The concept of Multipolar Anarchy aims to advance a more nuanced understanding of current global dynamics. It is grounded in key tenets of realist theory in international relations and conceptually linked to the idea of regiopolarity—that is, the predominance of regional powers within their respective spheres in the absence of an overarching global hegemon.[iii]

Multipolar Anarchy refers to an international system marked by the absence—or near absence—of binding global rules and institutions, coupled with the existence or emergence of relatively stable regional orders upheld by dominant actors or alliances. In essence, it describes a fragmented global landscape in which international anarchy coexists with pockets of regional order.

This phase should be viewed as an intermediate condition on the path toward a more stable global configuration—whether it takes the form of renewed unipolarity, a bipolar structure reminiscent of the Cold War, or a yet-to-be-defined alternative. While transitional in nature, this condition may well persist for decades. It is therefore useful to briefly examine the three core components of Multipolar Anarchy: global anarchy, regional order, and fragmented governance.

Global anarchy denotes the absence of a universally accepted global authority. The United States briefly fulfilled this role following the Cold War, and for a few decades prior, authority was divided between the leaders of two antagonistic blocs. Multilateral institutions were tools of such hegemonic global governance. Today, because of the decline or deliberate retreat of the old hegemons, they are weakened, contested, or dysfunctional. Economically, for example, the World Trade Organization has been losing relevance amid a proliferation of bilateral trade agreements. When U.S. President Donald Trump imposed sweeping tariffs on key trading partners, the WTO was largely absent from public discourse and played no discernible role in mitigating the ensuing trade tensions. Politically, the United Nations continues to exist but remains strikingly ineffective in addressing major conflicts such as the war in Ukraine, the crisis in Gaza, and hostilities between Israel and Iran. While it is conceivable that some traditional international institutions may restructure themselves and eventually regain relevance, it is equally possible that emerging actors will seek to fill the void by establishing new multilateral frameworks. The creation of the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed) on 30 May 2025 serves as a case in point.[iv] But for now, interstate outcomes are largely shaped by power politics.

Regional order has emerged as a countervailing force to global anarchy. Rulemaking and enforcement increasingly take place at the regional level, often led by regional hegemons or institutionalized alliances.[v] These orders may be grounded in shared norms, economic integration, security imperatives, or a combination thereof. Examples include the European Union, ASEAN, NATO, BRICS, MERCOSUR, the Five Eyes alliance, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the C5+ Alliance of Central Asian States, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). While differing in form and function, they illustrate the growing relevance of regional structures in shaping international relations.

Fragmented governance is the inevitable outcome of these processes. In the absence of a dominant global power or ideology, multiple rule systems, normative frameworks, and strategic logics coexist. Regional dynamics and competing visions of multilateral governance increasingly shape global developments—yet fall short of providing overarching integration.

The concept of Multipolar Anarchy thus offers a framework for understanding how regional powers fill the vacuum left by eroding global leadership. It also provides a lens through which to analyse, anticipate, and influence the strategic behaviour of middle powers as they navigate between global uncertainty and regional alignment.

Historical Disruption and Strategic Agency in East Asia: Lessons from the Late 19th Century

History, as the saying goes, does not repeat itself, but it often rhymes. For scholars of international relations and historical institutionalism alike, this observation is more than rhetorical: it highlights the enduring patterns in how polities respond to systemic disruption. East Asia’s experience in the late 19th and early 20th centuries exemplifies how exogenous shocks interact with domestic agency to produce radically different trajectories. While structural pressures may be comparable, outcomes are contingent on strategic choices, institutional capacity, and ideational orientation.

The disintegration of the Sinocentric order in the face of Western imperialism posed a common challenge to China, Korea, and Japan.[vi] Yet the responses and their outcomes diverged sharply, illustrating the non-deterministic nature of systemic change.

China, the hegemon of the old order, experienced a steep decline. Weakened by internal corruption, institutional sclerosis, and a failure to reform proactively, the Qing dynasty succumbed to both external invasion and internal collapse. What followed was a protracted period of fragmentation, warlordism, and foreign domination. Even after 1949, the legacies of division persisted. China’s current reassertion of regional influence can thus be seen as part of a long arc of recovery—still shaped by the trauma of past humiliations.

Korea, historically an independent kingdom but with a close orientation towards China, also failed to institutionalize meaningful reform in time and fell victim to annexation by Japan in 1910. The human and strategic costs were and still are enormous. After liberation in 1945, the peninsula was divided by Cold War antagonisms into two ideologically opposed states—a division that remains unresolved and continues to define regional geopolitics.

Japan, in contrast, was quick enough to react to the new situation. It embarked on a path of radical modernization beginning with the Meiji Restoration. It rapidly industrialized and militarized, emerging as a regional great power. Although its imperial ambitions culminated in catastrophic defeat in 1945, Japan successfully reoriented its national strategy in the postwar period, leveraging American security guarantees to become a global economic powerhouse.

These divergent cases underscore a central insight of institutionalist theory: critical junctures create windows of opportunity, but the choices made during these moments—embedded in specific historical and cultural contexts—shape long-term developmental paths.[vii] In periods of multipolar anarchy and normative uncertainty, agency matters.

Today, the world faces a new phase of systemic transition. As in earlier historical junctures, the outcomes of this period are not preordained. What matters is whether actors are able to recognize the structural stakes involved, exercise strategic foresight, and act with both clarity and urgency.

Time remains a scarce and unforgiving resource. History suggests that states who respond fast enough and with institutional adaptability and strategic foresight may not only weather the storm but emerge strengthened. Conversely, those who fail to act with sufficient clarity and resolve risk long-term marginalization or decline. The stakes at such historical crossroads are high; the choices made today may define national trajectories for decades to come.

Forward-Looking Strategies for Middle Powers in a Fragmenting World Order

If time is scarce and the stakes are high, the key question becomes: how should small and middle powers—understood as states that do not belong to the very small group of great powers—respond?

The first and most essential step is to acknowledge the new strategic reality. This is not a matter of academic abstraction or ivory-tower debate. We are indeed operating in an unstable and transitional international environment—one that will not return to the pre-Trump status quo. Too many developments have already been set in motion. Assuming that the liberal international order can simply be restored is both naïve and potentially dangerous. Fortunately, most political, business, and intellectual elites in many middle powers appear to have come to terms with this new configuration of global affairs. Those who have not would be well advised to do so—sooner rather than later.

However, passive adaptation will not suffice. What is required – but in some cases still lacking – is an active and forward-looking strategic response. So far, the most notable reaction to the emerging multipolar disorder is a trend that could be termed ‘Jucheization’, to make a somewhat ironic allusion to North Korea’s flawed yet persistent strategy of self-reliance.

This instinctive turn inward is now reflected in global discourses on decoupling, de-risking, supply chain sovereignty, and strategic autonomy. The logic of this approach closely mirrors the four pillars of the original Juche concept, which in turn bears notable resemblance to earlier doctrines such as mercantilism and isolationism: (1) the development of a distinct ideological narrative, (2) a foreign policy grounded in independence and national focus, (3) economic self-reliance, and (4) autonomous military capabilities. Whether this approach will lead to resilience or isolation remains uncertain, but it reflects a broader strategic impulse to reduce external vulnerability in an increasingly volatile world.

While such measures may provide short-term relief, they fall short of constituting a sustainable long-term strategy. Middle powers must go beyond defence and risk aversion. One viable grand strategy is to identify and actively pursue emerging opportunities. This requires a pragmatic orientation towards what is feasible, based on national capabilities, geographic positioning, and strategic interests. If global cooperation proves unattainable, then targeted cooperation with willing partners should be prioritized. Existing alliances such as the EU could overcome their longstanding paralysis that way.

Among the many economic opportunities that demand active engagement are the creation of alternative supply chain routes; the renegotiation and diversification of trade agreements; the reassessment of dependencies within global payment systems and reserve currencies; and the strategic strengthening of domestic markets and industries as pillars of national resilience.

In the realm of international security, regional cooperation should take precedence. As global institutions continue to weaken, regional frameworks are becoming ever more essential. With increasing freedom from the gravitational pull of traditional hegemons, middle powers now enjoy greater autonomy to build and sustain such arrangements. Alliances among like-minded states facing comparable pressures can enhance collective resilience and amplify their strategic voice. In many cases, regional security architectures may effectively substitute for global norms and rules that no longer command authority or legitimacy.

A more ambitious and potentially transformative strategy lies in expanding and linking these regional groupings. Inter-regional dialogue and cooperation are more likely to yield balanced and mutually beneficial outcomes than asymmetric bilateral negotiations between small and large powers. While this will not eliminate global anarchy, it may mitigate its effects by constructing growing islands of order within an otherwise fragmented system.

At the same time, middle powers must remain vigilant. Other actors—state and non-state alike—are now freer than at almost any point in the past 80 years to pursue their own strategies—often in ways that are neither cooperative nor benign. Anticipating competition and preparing for conflict is not alarmism; it is prudence.

In conclusion, middle powers may not be in a position to shape the global system as a whole—but by acting swiftly, thinking regionally, and connecting strategically, they can shape their own future and mitigate potential risks. If this new era of multipolar anarchy is approached not merely as a threat but as a window of opportunity, it may even open the door to substantive reform and the emergence of a new global order—one that more accurately reflects the profound transformations the world has undergone since 1945. Multipolar anarchy does not preclude order. It invites those with vision and resolve to shape what comes next.

[i] Kupchan, C. (2012). No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn. Oxford University Press; Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). The End of Liberal International Order? International Affairs, 94(1), 7–23.

[ii] Buzan, B., & Lawson, G. (2015). The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations. Cambridge University Press.

[iii] Acharya, A. (2014). The End of the American World Order. Polity.

[iv] Master, F. (2025). “China sets up international mediation body in Hong Kong“, Reuters, 20.05.2025, https://www.reuters.com/en/china-sets-up-sets-up-international-mediation-body-hong-kong-2025-05-30, accessed 03.07.2025.

[v] Agrawal, R. (2025). “Can the World Do Anything About Conflict in 2025?”, Foreign Policy, Jan. 10, 2025. https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/01/10/conflict-2025-sudan-haiti-syria-iran-korea-myanmar/

[vi] Westad, O. A. (2012). Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750. The Bodley Head.

[vii] Capoccia, G. and D. Kelemen (2007). “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism.” World Politics, Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 341–369.